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Many of our everyday choices are associated with outcomes that are both delayed and 
probabilistic. The tyranny of small decisions describes a chronic pattern of present-bias 
decisions that result in negative outcomes in the future. The temporal attention hypothesis 
suggests that individuals’ decision making can be improved by focusing attention to 
temporally distal events and reducing the desire for proximate outcomes. Viewing 
discounting within a temporal attention framework implies that environmental 
manipulations that expand the limits of an individual’s temporal perspective by bringing 
focus on temporally distal outcomes, and thereby reducing present bias, may alter his/her 
degree of discounting. One such manipulation, episodic future thinking (EpFT), has 
shown to successfully lower discount rates. Several questions remain as to the 
applicability of EpFT to domains other than temporal discounting. The present 
experiments examine the effects of a modified EpFT procedure on probability 
discounting in the context of both a delayed health gain and loss. Results indicate the 
modified EpFT procedure effectively altered individuals’ degree of discounting in the 
predicted directions and lend further support to the temporal attention hypothesis. 
Keywords: probability discounting, episodic future thinking, temporal attention, 
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Table 1. Area under the curve. Note: Non-bolded values indicate baseline 
and bolded values indicate mEpFT phase. 
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Table 2. Area under the curve. Note: Non-bolded values indicate baseline 





Figure 1. Example images of the age progression. The top image (A) is an 
actual photo of the first author. The middle image (B) is the 
nonaged computer-generated image created by using the photo of 
the first author. Although participants in the experiment never 
saw their nonaged computer-generated images, creating a 
nonaged image was necessary to create the future-self images 
and so I display that here. The bottom images (C) are three 
future-self computer-generated images with three emotions (from 
left to right): sad, neutral, and happy. Participants saw two 
additional images that approximated a balance between the sad 
and neutral images and between the happy and neutral images. 
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Figure 2. Mean (± SEM) likelihood of quitting for last three blocks of 
baseline (open squares) and first three blocks of mEpFT (open 
circles) phases. The shaded area between the curves indicates 
area change (a negative effect is represented by a lack of shading 
between indifference points for GP4). Semi-log inserts provided 
for the smaller odds in favor values. 
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Figure 3. Percent change in standardized area between the curves.  
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Figure 4. Mean (± SEM) likelihood of quitting at each probability value 
for all participants. Major phase change line indicates the change 
from baseline to mEpFT phase and minor phase change line 
indicates the separation between the first three sessions and last 
three sessions of the mEpFT phase. 
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Figure 5. Likelihood of quitting at each probability value across 
consecutive blocks. Major phase change line indicates transition 
from baseline to mEpFT phase. 
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Figure 6. Mean (± SEM) likelihood of continuing for last three blocks of 
baseline (open squares) and first three blocks of mEpFT (open 
circles) phases. The shaded area between the curves indicates 
area change (a negative effect is represented by a lack of shading 





for the smaller odds against values. 
 
Figure 7. Percent change in standardized area between the curves. 
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Figure 8. Mean (± SEM) likelihood of continuing at each probability value 
for all participants. Major phase change line indicates the change 
from baseline to mEpFT phase and minor phase change line 
indicates the separation between the first three sessions and last 
three sessions of the mEpFT phase. Note that unlike Figure 4, the 
topmost symbols are associated with the smallest probability 
values and the bottommost with the largest probability values. 
 
49 
Figure 9. Likelihood of continuing at each probability value across 
consecutive blocks. Major phase change line indicates transition 
from baseline to mEpFT phase. Note that unlike Figure 4, the 
topmost symbols are associated with the smallest probability 
values and the bottommost with the largest probability values. 
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High-Resolution Effects of Modified Episodic Future Thinking: 
Personalized Age-Progressed Pictures Improve Risky Long-Term Health Decisions 
Throughout the history of human civilization, many of the great collapses of 
countries, states, and empires can be attributed to a focus on the present (Diamond, 
2005), rather than an eye on the future. This myopic view is exemplified by a chronic 
pattern of small, almost inconsequential decisions that eventually culminate into a large 
disastrous problem. Unfortunately, these outcomes are often irreversible. Consider the 
collapse of Easter Island (Diamond, 1995). It is believed that inhabitants of Easter Island 
slowly deforested the land in an effort to erect statues, without consideration of the long-
term effect on their habitat. As a result, fertile land to grow crops diminished and most of 
their civilization collapsed after intense violence. This scenario exemplifies the tyranny of 
small decisions (Bickel & Marsch, 2000), a chronic pattern of myopic decisions that 
seem beneficial for the individual now, but results in suboptimal outcomes later on. 
The field of behavioral economics seeks to understand this adverse pattern of 
decision making by way of discounting (Reed, Niileksela, & Kaplan, 2013). Specifically, 
discounting occurs when the subjective value of an outcome decreases based on some 
contextual factor(s) such as the delay to receipt of the outcome (temporal discounting) or 
the chance of the outcome occurring (probability discounting). Steep temporal 
discounting (i.e., the value of an outcome decreases rapidly as a function of the delay to 
receipt) has been shown to be associated with a wide range of substance abuse disorders 
and other harmful health behaviors (Bickel, Jarmolowicz, Mueller, Koffarnus, & 
Gatchalian, 2012; Bickel, Johnson, Koffarnus, MacKillop, & Murphy, 2014; Madden & 




probability discounting occurs when the subjective value of an outcome is devalued as 
the likelihood of that outcome occurring decreases. Said another way, the value of an 
outcome is inversely related to the odds against receiving that outcome, such that value 
decreases as the odds against increases. There is some evidence to suggest that excessive 
probability discounting is associated with maladaptive outcomes (e.g., pathological 
gambling, substance abuse), although the literature is mixed (Bickel et al., 2014) and 
incomplete. In any case, examining discounting and ways to change it might very well be 
helpful in understanding socially important behavior (Critchfield & Kollins, 2001).  
One solution to overcome the potentially adverse pattern of behavioral decision 
making is by strategically targeting a single-decision event (e.g., point-of-purchase 
situation) and by using the hyperbolic nature of discounting to its advantage (Ainslie, 
1975). A commitment response, another one-time decision making event, is an active 
form of self-control (Skinner, 1953) where an organism commits to a decision path 
leading to more favorable long-term outcomes by circumventing preference reversals 
(Rachlin & Green, 1972), a hallmark characteristic of hyperbolic discounting. Save More 
Tomorrow™ (Thaler & Benartzi, 2004), one of the most notable programs to promote 
and help employees save for the future, used commitment responses to allow users to 
automatically increase their savings rate by a small amount every time they were awarded 
a pay raise. Compared to those who did not enroll, participants in the Save More 
Tomorrow™ program had almost quadrupled their savings rate in under four years. In 
this program, rather than making a series of decisions to increase his/her savings rate 




circumventing the need to make repeated choices between some amount of money now 
and more money later. 
In an experiment by Hershfield and colleagues (2011) aimed at changing 
individuals’ willingness to save for the future at a point-of-purchase situation, 
participants made hypothetical investment choices in the presence of a computer-
generated model of themselves. While viewing either their computer-generated present- 
or future-self, participants responded in a computerized investment simulation by sliding 
a line along a bar to indicate how much of their current income they would allocate to 
retirement. As participants allocated a smaller percentage of their current income to 
retirement, the present face’s emotion changed and became happier while the future face 
became sadder (the reverse occurred when allocating relatively more income to 
retirement). As a result, individuals in the future-self condition allocated a significantly 
higher percentage of their current income to retirement as compared to those in the 
present-self condition. Merrill Edge, a large wealth management company, recently 
introduced this concept of age-progression in their Face Retirement campaign 
(http://faceretirement.merrilledge.com/) in an attempt to influence the user to make wise 
financial decisions by age-progressing users’ faces via a webcam while logging into their 
online retirement portfolio. These strategies utilizing age progression manipulations used 
by Hershfield et al. and Merrill Lynch to influence decision making – as related to 
temporally distal events such as retirement – in the here and now is consistent with the 
temporal attention hypothesis. 




The temporal attention hypothesis stipulates that individuals tend to perceive time 
to differing degrees (Bickel, Kowal, & Gatchalian, 2006; Radu, Yi, Bickel, Gross, & 
McClure, 2011) and that for some individuals, relatively distal events do little to control 
present behavior. For example, in one study heroin-dependent individuals and matched 
controls completed two tasks measuring time perspective including the Stanford Time 
Perception Inventory (STPI; Zimbardo, 1992) and Future Time Perspective (FTP; 
Wallace, 1956) (Petry, Bickel, & Arnett, 1998). As compared to controls, Petry and 
colleagues found that heroin addicts scored significantly lower on scales measuring focus 
on future events and significantly higher on scales measuring focus on present events. 
Further, when asked to complete fictional stories, heroin addicts completed stories with 
significantly shorter time frames as compared to controls. These results support the 
temporal attention hypothesis by demonstrating that individuals perceive time differently.  
The temporal attention hypothesis suggests that manipulations that focus attention 
to temporally distal events may serve as a potential method for improving decision 
making related to long-term outcomes without the need to target and reduce the desire for 
proximate outcomes (Radu et al., 2011). Towards this end, one method to improve long-
term decision making is through the use of the “explicit-zero” framing where explicit 
consequences are associated with alternatives. Radu et al. conducted a series of 
experiments to determine whether the mechanism underlying the “explicit-zero” 
manipulation was due to an improving sequence, whereby the present valuation of the 
delayed reward is enhanced, or due to temporal allocation shifted towards the delayed 
alternative. The researchers found the temporal attention hypothesis was better able to 




improving sequence hypothesis. Techniques that alter temporal attention provide a useful 
framework for which to change discounting. 
Another way to allocate temporal attention towards distal outcomes is through the 
use of episodic future thinking (EpFT)1 (Koffarnus, Jarmolowicz, Mueller, and Bickel, 
2013). In contrast to other framing manipulations, EpFT requires an active, overt 
response by the participant prior to making any intertemporal tradeoff decisions (Atance 
& O’Neill, 2001). Participants typically identify several events they plan to attend in the 
future and these events are assigned different delays. When faced with the intertemporal 
tradeoff options, these subject specific cues are displayed in an attempt to influence 
participant decision making. 
To examine the effects of EpFT on rates of discounting, Peters and Büchel (2010) 
recruited 30 healthy participants who reported events they had planned within the next 
seven months. Delays used in the subsequent discounting task were determined by 
matching the time until the planned event such that events happening relatively soon 
were associated with shorter delays and events happening later were associated with 
longer delays. Participants then completed two sessions of delay discounting tasks and 
were told that one of their choices would be randomly picked and the consequence 
delivered at the conclusion of the experiment. During half of the discounting trials, a 
subject-specific cue (e.g., trip to Paris) determined during the prescan interview was 
presented underneath the delay associated with the delayed option. In the remaining half 
of the trials, no subject-specific cue was presented. Results indicate discounting rates 
obtained during the EpFT trials were significantly lower than in the control trials. 
                                                 
1I adopt the acronym “EpFT” rather than “EFT” as to not confuse readers with executive functioning 




More recently, researchers examined the effects of EpFT on changes in delay 
discounting and number of food calories consumed among 26 overweight or obese 
women (Daniel, Stanton, & Epstein, 2013). Participants were randomly assigned to either 
a control or EpFT condition, where recently experienced (derived from a blog provided 
by the experimenters; control group) or possible future events (EpFT) were created and 
used as cues for the two groups in later experimental tasks. During the delay discounting 
task, participants in the control group were instructed to think about events from the blog 
and those in the experimental group about possible future events they provided earlier. In 
an ab libitum eating task, participants rated the sensory appeal of various foods and 
subsequently were provided free access to food for 15 min all while the cues were 
present. Participants in the EpFT condition displayed significantly less discounting and 
consumed significantly fewer calories as compared to those in the control condition. 
As discussed earlier, a potential method to allocate attention towards distal 
outcomes is through the use of EpFT manipulations and, indeed, several studies have 
successfully done so as evidenced by a change in temporal discounting rates (Daniel et 
al., 2013; Lin & Epstein, 2014; Peters & Büchel, 2010). Several questions regarding 
EpFT, however, remain unanswered. First, I am aware of no study that has explicitly 
applied an EpFT procedure to alter probability discounting. Second, it is unknown 
whether the effect of EpFT on rates of discounting can be achieved through different 
means other than using subject-specific tags (e.g., computer-generated future-self images; 
Hershfield et al., 2011). Third, EpFT studies have primarily dealt with monetary 
discounting and while Daniel and colleagues showed EpFT influenced eating behavior, it 




Finally, to my knowledge, EpFT has only been explicitly applied to discounting of gains. 
It is unclear whether an EpFT procedure will influence discounting of losses in a 
probabilistic choice scenario. 
The Present Experiments 
Viewing discounting within a temporal attention framework implies that 
environmental manipulations that expand the limits of an individual’s temporal 
perspective by bringing focus on temporally distal outcomes (e.g., EpFT) may alter 
degree of discounting. Although EpFT manipulations tend to use subject specific cues 
alone to produce changes in discounting, the current project attempts to alter degree of 
discounting through a novel approach. Given the several unanswered questions 
surrounding the applicability of EpFT procedures, the current experiments sought to 
examine the combined effects of computer-generated images (Hershfield et al., 2011) and 
an EpFT (through the use of a Future Health Questionnaire [FSQ]) procedure on 
probability discounting of a delayed health gain (Experiment 1) and loss (Experiment 2).  
Experiment 1 
Participants, Setting, and Materials 
Five undergraduate females ranging in age from 19 to 23 years old (M = 21, SD = 
1.87) recruited from an introductory class in applied behavior analysis participated (see 
Appendix A for participant recruitment script). Material in the introductory class covers 
only basic behavior analytic content (e.g., reinforcement, extinction, stimulus control) so 
class content did not interfere the procedures used in the current study. Participants 
completed an informed consent approved by the University of Kansas Human Subjects 




Approximately 3-6 blocks of trials were conducted each day within a 60 min session. In 
exchange for each 60 min session completed, participants earned .50% of extra credit 
added to their final grade in the class from which they were recruited. 
Participants completed sessions in a small 2.2 m by 2 m operant room with a 
darkened one-way observation mirror on one side and used a mouse to interact with a 
probabilistic choice task running on a Windows 7 based Dell PC and 21” wide-aspect 
monitor. Upon completion of the experiment, participants completed a standard 
demographics form (Appendix C), answered several questions regarding their thoughts 
about the experiment (Appendix D), and were debriefed. 
Computer-generated images. At the beginning of the first session, the researcher 
obtained three (direct, left, and right profiles) digital photographs (using a Kodak 
EasyShare M580 camera) of the participant’s face during which s/he was instructed to 
remain with a neutral emotion. These photographs were used in conjunction with 
FaceGen Modeller software from Singular Inversions© (Hershfield et al., 2011; 
http://www.facegen.com/modeller.htm) and Adobe® Photoshop® to create realistic 
computer-generated face and to render five unique computer-generated images of the 
participant’s face (Figure 1; see Appendix E for a thorough description of how these 
images were created). 
Future-self questionnaire. A questionnaire was developed in order to direct 
participants’ attention to their future-self, akin to previous EpFT studies. This future-self 
questionnaire (FSQ) was administered before the start of each block in the experimental 
manipulation phase. The FSQ consisted of four questions and a box below each question 




you be doing as your career in 30 years?, (2) Describe the ideal spouse you will have in 
30 years:, (3) How many kids will you have in 30 years?, and (4) Describe the type of 
home you will have in 30 years:. 
Procedure 
 Upon arriving at the first session, participants completed the informed consent 
form and the researcher obtained three – one direct and two side profile (left and right) – 
digital photographs of the participant’s face during which s/he was instructed to remain 
with a neutral emotion. After the informed consent and photographs were obtained, the 
participant completed a practice trial prior to starting the probabilistic choice task. In 
order to rule out repeated testing effects and to account for the possibility that the effects 
of a future thinking manipulation on probability discounting might not reverse, the 
current study used a non-concurrent multiple baseline design across participants. 
Probabilistic choice task. Participants responded on a probabilistic choice task 
designed using Microsoft Visual Basic® 2010. During this task, participants moved the 
position of a slider on a visual analogue scale (VAS; Johnson & Bruner, 2012; Kaplan, 
Reed, & McKerchar, 2014) to indicate their responses. Appendix F displays the input 
screen used by the experimenter to initialize the settings prior to each block of trials. To 
familiarize participants with the nature of the VAS, a practice trial was administered at 
the start of the first block during the first session (Appendix G). During the practice trial, 
the participant read the following instructions: 
“The following questions will ask you to indicate your answers on a scale. Before 
you begin, it will be helpful to practice using the cursor. Here is an example of 




room. You believe the temperature is 68 degrees Fahrenheit. Thus, you must click 
on the marker and – without releasing the click – slide the marker to 68, and then 
release your click. The number below the line will indicate the location of the 
cursor. Go ahead and slide the marker to 68 degrees and click submit.” 
 A 13.9 cm wide VAS, a submit button, and a label displaying the value associated 
with the VAS cursor location were located below the instructions. A value of “0” was 
displayed if the VAS cursor was set all the way to the left whereas a value of “100” was 
displayed if the VAS cursor was set all the way to the right. Participants were required to 
slide the VAS cursor to 68 degrees and submit the correct response before continuing on 
to the main portion of the probabilistic choice task. When participants slid the cursor to 
the correct value, a box appeared allowing them to continue (Appendix H). If the 
participant did not correctly set the cursor to 68 degrees, a box appeared with the 
following instructions: 
  “Please drag the marker to the correct value.” 
 Baseline. At the start of every block of trials, the following instructions were 
presented for 45 s (Appendix I): 
“Welcome to our experiment! 
The purpose of the present study is to measure how likely you would be to 
continue and/or quit a particular hobby. 
Please make your decisions as if all scenarios involved were real. There 




On the following screens, you will sometimes see a bar with a triangular 
cursor. You will use the cursor to scroll along the bar to decide how likely 
you would be to continue/quit a particular hobby. 
You will have several seconds until a button appears to submit your 
choice. Please submit your choice when the button appears. 
If you do not understand these instructions, please ask the researcher any 
questions you may have now. If you do understand these instructions, 
please click the button below.” 
Once 45 s elapsed, a button with the text, “I have read and understand these 
instructions” appeared directly below the instructions. After clicking the button to 
proceed, participants read and answered the following health related question associated 
with a probabilistic gain:  
“Imagine you are in perfect health and enjoy a particular hobby. 
You learn that quitting this hobby permanently will increase your 
chances of being alive and cancer-free by XX% in 30 years. 
How likely are you to quit this hobby?” 
 The value of XX, indicating the probabilities, was shown in descending order 
across all trials: 95, 90, 75, 50, 25, 10, and 5%. Response values ranged from 0-100% 
likely to quit. In an attempt to match real-world contingencies related to health outcomes 
and specifically cancer risk, the gain and loss (Experiment 2) outcomes associated with 
each question were set at a fixed 30 yr delay. 
 At the beginning of each trial, only the probabilistic health question was 




clicking submit, you will move on to the next question,” appeared directly below the 
question. Participants responded to the question by sliding a cursor along the VAS and 
clicked the button to progress to the next trial. Labels lay to the left and right ends of the 
VAS. The label on the left read “Not at all likely” and the label on the right read 
“Extremely likely.” Unlike the practice trial, participants’ movement of the cursor 
rendered no feedback on the value associated with the cursor position. The VAS and 
button were displayed for 10 s. Either after 10 s or when the participant clicked the 
submit button, the VAS, button, and label disappeared for 5 s and the blackout period 
began during which the entire screen turned black. If 10 s elapsed without a response by 
the participant, the program recorded an omission and proceeded to the blackout period. 
The amount of time for which the blackout period was in effect depended upon 
the latency between when the submit button became visible and when the participant 
clicked the submit button. The blackout period lasted for a minimum of 14 s but could 
last up to an additional 9 s depending upon the latency of the participant to respond. For 
example, if the participant clicked the submit button 4 s after the appearance of the 
submit button, the remaining 6 s were added to the blackout duration. This aspect of the 
program not only ensured all trials lasted approximately 45 s but also ensured that 
participants were unable to end the block, and thus, session, early by responding quickly.  
Immediately following each block, the researcher calculated area under the curve 
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using Discounter software (www.smallnstats.com) and graphed the corresponding value 




Johnson and Bickel’s (2008) criteria for systematic discounting. Visual inspection was 
used to verify there was no increasing or decreasing monotonic trend during the last three 
data points in order to proceed to the next phase. 
 Modified episodic future thinking (mEpFT) procedure. During the mEpFT 
phase, participants were shown a full-size (neutral) image of their computer-generated 
future-self prior to completing each block of the probabilistic choice task. During the first 
block of this phase, participants were told the following: 
“I’m going to ask you several questions. As I’m reading these questions please 
look at yourself 30 years in the future and think about your answers to these 
questions. You do not need to say your answers out loud; I’d just like you to think 
about your answers. After I am done asking you these questions, I’ll give you time 
to write your answers to these questions.” 
 After the experimenter finished asking the questions, participants wrote their 
answers on the FSQ. Once the participant completed the questionnaire, the researcher 
reentered the room, started the program, and the participant began the probabilistic choice 
task. The same probabilistic health question used in baseline was used during this phase. 
Upon starting the probabilistic choice task, but before being able to respond to the 
question via the VAS, participants viewed five pictures of their future self with the five 
unique emotions as described earlier (Appendix J). The future-self computer-generated 
images were ordered from left to right from sad to happy and occupied space on the 
screen right below the VAS. The VAS was divided into five sections, each corresponding 
with a single future-self picture. After the pictures were displayed for 5 s, they 




the page, along with a label that read, “Note: By clicking submit, you will move on to the 
next question,” appeared for 10 s (Appendix K). Once the participant clicked the submit 
button, one of the five future-self pictures appeared for 5 s followed by a blackout period 
where the entire screen turned black (Appendix L). The blackout period functioned the 
same as in baseline. The picture that was presented following the participant’s selection 
was associated with the location of the cursor on the VAS. That is, if the cursor was in 
the first section (VAS values between 0-20) when the participant submitted his/her 
response, the picture on the far left was displayed following submission.  
Data Analysis 
 Prior to any data analyses, the seven probability values (ranging from 95% to 5%) 
were converted to odds in favor values using the following equation: 
Θ = (1 – p) / p                  Equation (2) 
where Θ is the odds in favor and p is the probability. The resulting values were as 
follows: .053, .111, .333, 1, 3, 9, and 19. 
The primary dependent measure of interest was the likelihood of quitting the 
particular hobby with values ranging from 0% to 100% likely in both the baseline and 
mEpFT phases. By plotting the likelihood values of both phases, a standardized area 
between the curves was obtained by first calculating the area under the curve for each 
phase, standardizing these values out of one by dividing the total area possible by the 
obtained areas, and finally subtracting these standardized values from one another. A 
secondary measure of interest was the stability of reported likelihood values over the 






 For each participant, two discounting curves were plotted using the mean reported 
likelihood of quitting at each probability from the last three blocks of baseline and first 
three blocks of the mEpFT phase. Comparisons between the last three blocks of baseline 
and the first three blocks of the mEpFT phase, rather than between baseline and the last 
three blocks of the mEpFT phase, were made because I was primarily interested in the 
immediate change in the reported likelihood of quitting, akin to a point-of-purchase 
setting. Figure 2 shows these curves with error bars showing one standard error of the 
mean. To better visualize the difference in the reported likelihood of quitting at the 
smaller odds in favor values, semi-log scaled insets are displayed within each graph. 
Participants GP1, GP2, and GP3 show robust increases in the likelihood of quitting with 
mEpFT (increased area shaded) whereas GP4 and GP5 show very little difference. GP1 
and GP4 show the greatest increase in likelihood of quitting at the smaller odds against 
values, whereas little if any increase was seen for GP2 and GP5. Traditional area under 
the curve (Myerson et al., 2001; Equation 1) was calculated for each participant during 
each block and is displayed in Table 1. However, to compare the change in area under the 
curves for each participant, I calculated a standardized area between each participant’s 
two curves from Figure 2. I did this by taking the area under each curve, standardizing it 
against the largest possible area, and subtracting the area under the mEpFT curve from 
the area under the baseline curve. 
 Figure 3 shows the standardized area between the curves, rank ordered from 
greatest change to least change. Four out of the five participants displayed an increase in 




 To show specific changes in the reported likelihood of quitting as a result of the 
mEpFT manipulation, participants’ reported likelihood at each odds in favor value for the 
last three blocks in baseline and first and last three blocks of the experimental 
manipulation were averaged and are displayed in Figure 4. On average, the most 
pronounced shifts in reported likelihood occurred at the 25% and 10% probabilities. That 
is, levels in the reported likelihood of quitting remained relatively stable for the larger 
probabilities, but larger changes occurred as probabilities decreased. Given the data in 
Figure 4 display aggregate data, I further explored individual’s reported likelihood of 
quitting using higher resolution analyses. 
 Figure 5 shows individual’s reported likelihood of quitting at each probability 
across consecutive blocks. Participants GP1, GP3, and GP5 show the clearest 
demonstration of differentiation in reported likelihood to quit between the different 
probability values. The immediate effect of mEpFT on reported likelihood is best 
illustrated by examining these levels prior to and following the implementation of 
mEpFT. As can be seen for GP1, small increases across the likelihood values were seen 
after the phase change across all probability values, with the largest increases at 25% 
(12.5 to 35.3) and 10% (0 to 18.9). Tying back to Figures 1 and 2 where there was little 
shading in the area between the curves and the associated 0% change in the standardized 
area between the curves for GP4, these patterns can be seen by the relatively small 
change in level prior to and following the phase change. 
Discussion 
 The goal of Experiment 1 was to determine the extent to which exposure to a 




alter participants’ reported likelihood of quitting a particular hobby when the quitting the 
hobby would result in a delayed, yet probabilistic health gain. Exposure to these stimuli 
resulted in an increased reported likelihood of quitting for four out of the five participants 
across a range of probabilities, with the most notable increases occurring at the 10% and 
25% probabilities. To my knowledge, this is the first demonstration of an EpFT 
derivative to change degree of probability discounting of a health gain. 
 At the aggregate level, the largest changes in the reported likelihood to quit the 
hobby occurred at the 10% and 25% probabilities. However, some participants showed 
larger increases at other probabilities (e.g., GP1, GP3; see Figure 5) whereas some 
participants showed decreases at a number of different probabilities (e.g., GP2; 75%). It 
may be the case that a ceiling effect contributed to the relatively small changes in the 
largest probabilities. For example, although the reported likelihood of quitting by GP5 
decreased for the second largest probability (90%) immediately following the phase 
change, levels of reported likelihood just prior to the phase change were high (98.2 vs. 
97.99). The potential ceiling effect may have been a result of the wording of the question: 
“How likely are you to quit this hobby?” With such high probabilities associated with the 
health gain (e.g., 95%, 90%) and the already high reported likelihood of quitting during 
baseline, it may have been the case that there was little room for the reported likelihoods 
to increase. To address this potential limitation, I used different wording of the question 
in Experiment 2. 
 Although the results show that the manipulation altered the degree of discounting 
in the predicted direction, these changes were only demonstrated in the context of a 




health related decisions are often negative and it is unknown whether similar changes 
would be observed in the context of a health loss. Experiment 2 explored whether the 
current experimental manipulation would result in changes in discounting in the context 
of a health loss.  
Experiment 2 
 The purpose of Experiment 2 was to examine the effects of the mEpFT on 
probability discounting of a delayed health loss. I hypothesized that following the 
experimental manipulation participants will report a lower likelihood of continuing a 
particular hobby as compared to baseline. 
Participants, Setting, and Materials 
Five undergraduate females ranging in age from 19 to 21 years (M = 20.2, SD = 
.84) and one undergraduate male (22 years old; LP5) recruited from an introductory class 
in applied behavior analysis participated. All other aspects of the experiment including 
compensation, session and block duration, materials, and setting were the same as 
Experiment 1. 
Computer-generated images  
The same procedure from Experiment 1 to create the computer-generated images 
was used in the current experiment. 
Future-self questionnaire  





 All aspects of the experiment were the same as in Experiment 1 except for the 
wording of the probabilistic health question and the ordering of the five unique computer-
generated images. Participants in the current experiment read the following question: 
“Imagine you are in perfect health and enjoy a particular hobby. 
You learn that continuing this hobby one more time will increase your 
risk of dying of cancer by XX% in 30 years. 
How likely are you to continue this hobby?” 
The same probabilities from Experiment 1 were used in the current experiment: 
95, 90, 75, 50, 25, 10, and 5%. Response values also ranged from 0-100% likely to 
continue. Unlike Experiment 1 where the ordering from left to right of the five unique 
computer-generated images underneath the VAS ranged from sad to happy, this ordering 
was reversed such that the happy face was now closest to the “Not at all likely” label. 
Data Analysis 
  Data were analyzed using the same methods as in Experiment 1. 
Results 
 Similar to Experiment 1, for each participant two discounting curves were plotted 
using the mean reported likelihood of continuing at each probability from the last three 
blocks of baseline and first three blocks of the mEpFT phase. Figure 6 shows these 
curves with error bars showing one standard error of the mean. To better visualize the 
difference in the reported likelihood of quitting at the smaller odds against values, semi-
log scaled insets are displayed within each graph. Participants LP4 and LP6 showed the 
greatest area between the curves at the smaller odds against values, whereas three out of 




under the curve (Myerson et al., 2001; Equation 1) was calculated for each participant 
during each block and is displayed in Table 2. As in Experiment 1, I standardized the 
change in area under the curves for each participant to make direct comparisons by 
standardizing each of the two curves for each participant in Figure 6 and subtracting the 
area under the mEpFT curve from the area under the baseline curve. 
 Figure 7 displays the percent change in standardized area between the curves, 
rank ordered from greatest to least change. All participants except LP5 showed a negative 
percent change in the area between the curves. This is expected given I hypothesized that 
exposure to the experimental manipulation would decrease the reported likelihood of 
continuing the hobby. To further evaluate where these changes occurred with respect to 
probability values, the next two figures display data using higher resolution analyses. 
 To show specific changes in the reported likelihood of quitting as a result of the 
mEpFT manipulation, participants’ reported likelihood at each odds in favor value for the 
last three blocks in baseline and first and last three blocks of the experimental 
manipulation were averaged and are displayed in Figure 8. Following the phase change, 
the largest decreases in the average likelihood of continuing occurred at the 5%, 10%, 
and 25% probabilities. Although there was a small decrease at the 75% probability, 
substantial overlap in the largest probabilities (≥ 50%) still occurred. During the last three 
blocks of the mEpFT phase, levels of the likelihood of continuing associated with the 
largest probabilities (≥ 50%) increased to roughly 25% and almost exclusive overlap 
occurred for all the probabilities other than 5% and 10%. To further explore these 





 Individual reports of likelihood of continuing across consecutive blocks are 
displayed in Figure 9. Note the ascending sequence of probability values associated with 
the legend. Several patterns emerge when examining data at this level of analysis. First, 
the large decreases in level associated with the two smallest probability values can be 
seen for participants LP1, LP2, LP4, and LP6. Participants LP1, LP4, and LP6 show an 
immediate decrease in the reported likelihood of continuing following exposure to 
mEpFT, whereas LP2 shows a more gradual decline across the first three blocks of 
mEpFT. LP4 and LP6 also show a large and immediate decrease associated with 
probability values larger than 5% and 10%. Interesting patterns were observed for 
participants LP1, LP4, and LP6. For LP6, there was an initial convergence in the reported 
likelihood of continuing immediately following the phase change. However, across 
blocks, the data paths became more differentiated and mostly returned to baseline levels 
(note the decrease from baseline levels for the highest probabilities, 90% and 95%). 
Participant LP4’s reported likelihood of continuing also converged following the phase 
change but did not return to baseline levels. LP1 showed a gradual return to baseline 
levels towards the end of the mEpFT phase. Finally, LP3 showed a distinct pattern in that 
the reported likelihood of continuing was either very high (100%) or very low (0%) with 
little variability. Taken together, for most participants a clear decrease in likelihood of 
continuing occurred after the phase change with levels beginning to return to those 
similar in baseline towards the end of the phase. 
Discussion 
 The goal of Experiment 2 was to examine the effects of exposure to a mEpFT 




the FSQ) on degree of probabilistic discounting of a delayed health loss. Five out of the 
six participants demonstrated a decrease in the reported likelihood of continuing the 
hobby after exposure to the experimental manipulation. This is the first study of which I 
am aware that has explicitly examined the effects of an EpFT manipulation to a 
probabilistic health loss. 
 The largest changes in reported likelihood to continue occurred at the smallest 
probabilities, specifically 5%, 10%, and 25%. Visual inspection suggests there were 
larger changes at the lower probabilities for the health loss than the health gain. This 
might be due to framing effect where the health loss was perceived as more aversive than 
the health gain, in line with prospect theory (Tversky & Kahneman, 1986, 1992). 
Conclusions should be tempered as the framing of the wording of the two health 
questions are not statistically equivalent. Previous studies examining the “framing effect” 
have typically used statistically equivalent outcomes (e.g., Tversky & Kahneman, 1981); 
however, the health related questions in the current study differ based on the initial level 
of risk. For example, quitting a hobby that otherwise increases the risk of developing 
cancer by 95% is not the same as a 5% chance of being alive and well by continuing the 
hobby. Although I phrased the questions as to match real-world contingencies, akin to 
what an individual might be told by a doctor, future researchers should address this 
limitation by stating exact risk (e.g., continuing a certain hobby will result in a 95% risk 
of dying of cancer), rather than a relative increase in risk. 
 Another potential reason why I might not have seen changes at the larger 
probabilities might be due to floor effects. In Figure 9, almost 0% reported likelihood 




participants. Thus, when faced with a health loss given continuation of a hobby, reported 
likelihood was already low during baseline so there was little room for those reports to 
decrease following the mEpFT procedure. 
General Discussion 
The goal of the current experiments was to determine the extent to which 
exposure to computer-generated future-self images and completion of a FSQ in a mEpFT 
procedure would alter participants’ reported likelihood of quitting or continuing a hobby 
resulting a delayed, but probabilistic health gain or loss, respectively. Indeed, four out of 
the five participants in Experiment 1 and five out of the six participants in Experiment 2 
displayed changes in the predicted direction in their reported likelihood to quit/continue. 
This is the first study, of which I am aware, to apply an EpFT manipulation in an effort to 
alter individuals’ degree of probability discounting in the context of a health gain and 
loss. 
Although evidence suggests delay discounting and probability discounting are 
affected by different variables (Estle, Green, Myerson, & Holt, 2006; Green, Myerson, & 
Ostaszewski, 1999; Yi, de la Piedad, & Bickel, 2006), and thus might be separate 
processes (Jarmolowicz, Bickel, Carter, Franck, & Mueller, 2012; Green & Myerson, 
2013), it is interesting that the mEpFT procedure used in the current study resulted in 
robust changes in probability discounting of both gains and losses. These results lend 
support for the temporal attention hypothesis by demonstrating a change in individuals’ 
degree of probability discounting using a manipulation aimed to focus attention to 




It could be the case that participants in the current study responded to the 
probabilities as participants in previous EpFT studies responded in respect to delays. 
Further support for this notion and the temporal attention hypothesis, by way of the EpFT 
procedure, comes from the conceptualization that uncertainty and delay are analogous 
(Weber & Chapman, 2005) and that the more uncertain the event is, the more 
psychologically distant it is perceived (Todorov, Goren, & Trope, 2007; Wakslak, Trope, 
Liberman, & Alony, 2006). Although their preparation was quite different than the 
current one, Weber and Chapman found that, in some cases, not only did delay eliminate 
the certainty effect (i.e., overweighting certain outcomes) but also that risk eliminated the 
immediacy effect (i.e., overweighting immediate outcomes). This might suggest that 
temporal attention can be allocated to aspects other than distal outcomes and that the 
mEpFT procedure used in the current study did change participants’ responses to the 
probabilistic aspect of the health question. Future research might examine the extent to 
which techniques that have been shown to modify delay discounting also alter probability 
discounting. In addition, I kept the delay constant throughout both experiments as not to 
confound interpretations. As such, it would be beneficial to replicate the current findings 
while also manipulating delay in a parametric-like fashion, akin to Vanderveldt and 
colleagues’ procedure (2014), to determine whether such interactions between delay and 
risk are present. 
Even though the probabilistic health question was delayed, the mEpFT procedure 
effectively changed individuals’ degree of probability discounting for both gains and 
losses. These results have immediate, applied implications within the realm of promoting 




depending on the outcome of engaging (or failure to engage) in a particular behavior, 
framing the outcome in terms of a gain or a loss might be differentially effective in 
promoting the desired behavior (Rothman, Bartels, Wlaschin, & Salovey, 2006). The type 
of framing used in the current study best aligns with Levin, Schneider and Gaeth’s (1998) 
typology of a goal frame. A goal frame, often used in health-related scenarios, attempts 
to enhance the evaluation of a specific outcome or behavior and the outcome can be 
framed to focus attention on obtaining a positive consequence (gain frame) or avoid a 
negative consequence (loss frame) (Levin et al., 1998; p. 167). In a review of 28 research 
articles that used goal frames to change behavior, Levin and colleagues found the loss 
frame to be more effective in changing behavior. Although direct comparisons between 
the two experiments in the current study cannot be made given the differences in the 
question used (e.g., quitting vs continuing the hobby), visual inspection of the data 
(Figures 2 and 6) suggests the loss frame resulted in a greater change in the reported 
likelihood of quitting/continuing. A future study might evaluate the effects of the two 
kinds of frames while keeping the question (e.g., quitting vs continuing the hobby) 
constant. Nonetheless, the results from the current study demonstrate the mEpFT 
procedure was effective at changing behavior regardless of the frame. 
The current study has applied implications for manipulating decision making at 
the point of purchase. As discussed earlier, Merrill Edge’s Face Retirement campaign is 
currently using software to “age” potential clients (similar to the current study) in an 
attempt to influence online investment decisions. I believe it is possible apply these age 
morphing techniques, along with other targeted questions and evaluation forms, to 




“tyranny of small decisions” (Bickel & Marsch, 2000) work for, rather than against, the 
individual. For example, it might be possible to create a mobile device application that 
will automatically render future computer-generated images of the user’s face and 
combine this with information regarding the current weight, resting heart rate, and blood 
pressure of the user as well as the last time the user worked out to project a probabilistic 
risk assessment of not engaging in any exercise for that day. Integration between 
applications that manage health and money tracking, along with more sophisticated forms 
of image capturing, will allow for interventions such as these to be readily accessible. 
Since this is the first study to apply an EpFT derivative to probability discounting 
and the probabilistic choice task contained a delayed element, the extent to which the 
same manipulation would alter probability discounted sans a delayed component is 
unknown. Had the mEpFT procedure merely targeted the delayed aspect of the health 
outcome, I might have expected the reported likelihood of continuing/quitting to change 
either systematically across all the probability values or nonsystematically at all. 
Nevertheless, a logical next step would be to remove the delayed aspect of the 
probabilistic question to isolate the effects of EpFT on probability discounting. However, 
the results are promising given the ubiquity of everyday choices that involve both 
delayed and probabilistic components (e.g., Bickel & Marsch, 2000; Green & Myerson, 
2004; Vanderveldt et al., 2014). 
 As with many previous discounting studies, (Bickel, Odum, & Madden, 1999; 
Dixon & Holton, 2009; Dixon, Marley, & Jacobs, 2003; Johnson & Bickel, 2002; Odum, 
Madden, Badger, & Bickel, 2000) the current study used hypothetical outcomes rather 




research comparing real and hypothetical outcomes has found both types of outcomes are 
discounted similarly (Dixon, Lik, Green, & Myerson, 2013; Johnson & Bickel, 2002; 
Madden, et al., 2004; Madden, Begotka, Raiff, & Kastern, 2003). As Odum (2011) points 
out, discounting tasks ask questions that are qualitatively different from typical self-
report measures (e.g., asking about past behavior), which may be one reason for the 
better correspondence between real and hypothetical outcomes. In addition, there are 
usually no “right” or “wrong” answers as the participant is simply reporting their 
likelihood of engaging in some behavior or choosing between options. Relevant to the 
current study, it would be difficult, if not impossible, to directly deliver the health related 
consequences used in the probabilistic choice task. I conceptualized the health questions 
as ones an individual might encounter when consulting with a doctor or trained physician, 
a situation with which many people probably have experience. Notwithstanding the novel 
aspect of the probabilistic choice question, participants discounted the risks associated 
with the hobby systematically and all data passed Johnson and Bickel’s (2008) criteria for 
nonsystematic data.  
An additional limitation surrounds the mEpFT component entailing the age 
progressed images. It could have been the case that for some participants, their computer-
generated face was too dissimilar from what they might imagine themselves to look like 
in 30 years from now. Previous EpFT literature suggests that the more vivid subject-
specific cues are, or the reported degree of imagery (i.e., high vs. low), the greater the 
change in degree of discounting (Peters & Büchel, 2010). The difference between how 
participants viewed their computer-generated future-self and their perceptions of how 




discounting across the participants. However, during debriefing, I asked participants to 
rate on a Likert scale (1=extremely dissimilar to 7=extremely similar) the degree to 
which the images looked like them. The average rating by participants in Experiment 1 
was 4.5 (SD = 1) and the average rating by participants in Experiment 2 was 3.75 (SD = 
1.25). These differences in scores may have contributed to the idiosyncratic effects 
observed with respect to change in reported likelihood across the various probabilities, in 
terms of the majority of participants showing changes in the predicted direction at the 
lower probabilities and for some participants, increases at other probabilities. 
 My mEpFT procedure was additionally limited by the open-ended nature of the 
FSQ. It is possible that asking participants to self-generate the hobby might have 
differentially affected how participants responded to the question. For example, one 
participant reported that the hobby she was thinking of was indoor tanning whereas 
another participant reported she was thinking of smoking cigarettes, even though she was 
not a current smoker. Use of a concrete hobby or activity that participants identify 
beforehand might make effects more consistent across participants and may even increase 
the effects I obtained. Further, more robust effects might occur with clinical populations 
with the hobby being engaging in their activity or consuming their substance of abuse. A 
logical next step would be to simply layer the age progression component used in the 
current study onto more standard EpFT procedures (e.g., use of subject-specific tags; 
Peters & Büchel, 2010). 
 Certain aspects of the probabilistic choice task pose limitations for the current 
study. The program was written such that every trial lasted approximately 45 s and was 




10 s to respond during each trial and depending upon how quickly the participant 
responded, the remainder of that 10 s was added to that trial’s blackout period. While 
these aspects were included so that participants could not respond faster in an attempt to 
end the session quicker, there were instances where a participant failed to respond within 
10 s and when that occurred, the program recorded an omission. An omission occurred on 
at least one trial for all but one participant (GP4) in Experiment 1 and all but two (LP4 
and LP6) participants in Experiment 2. However, of those participants who did omit a 
response on at least one trial, the average number of omissions per person was 2.25 (R = 
1-4; STD = 1.04) and these omissions typically occurred during the first or second block 
of baseline. Therefore, the number of omitted trials comprised only 2% of the total 
number of trials. Although it does not appear the time constraint had a systematic effect 
on individuals’ degree of discounting, Ebert (2001) found that participants who were 
under a time constraint of 3 s displayed lower rates of delay discounting but only for the 
first half of the session. In addition, Dixon and colleagues (2013) found that when 
blackout periods contingent on immediate choices were used to hold reinforcement rate 
constant, participants displayed little to no discounting, whereas more typical discounting 
was observed when the aforementioned blackouts were absent. Several differences might 
account for why I observed more “typical” patterns of discounting even with the use of 
blackout periods. First, participants in the current study had more time to respond (e.g., 
10 s) as compared to Ebert’s study. While the effect obtained in his study was in the 
opposite direction as other studies that have taxed executive functioning (Hinson, 
Jameson, & Whitney, 2003), similar to Ebert’s, my study asked individuals to report a 




options. It is unknown whether time constraints affect discount rates the same way when 
individuals report a single value as when they have to choose between options. Second, 
the aforementioned studies assessed delay discounting, not probability discounting. 
While the probabilistic choice question did have a delayed component, delays were not 
systematically altered and pitted against an explicit immediate outcome as is more often 
the case in delay discounting studies. 
 Finally, while I employed a novel VAS procedure to assess degree of discounting, 
previous literature has supported the use of the VAS as a feasible response medium 
(Johnson & Bruner, 2013; Kaplan et al., 2014), especially in the contexts of questions 
where money is not easily equated. Degree of discounting as calculated using area under 
the curve (Myerson et al., 2001) remained relatively stable throughout the duration of the 
experiment even though trials and sessions were presented separately, corroborating the 
test-retest reliability analysis of the VAS (Johnson & Bruner, 2013). This demonstrates a 
promising approach to examine discounting across a wide range of domains. 
 In sum, results from the current study suggest EpFT was effective in changing 
degree of probability discounting of both a delayed health gain and loss. These results 
expand the scope of both the temporal attention hypothesis and the EpFT literature. The 
current study also demonstrates the applied utility in using EpFT and framing to change 
behavior, especially in the context of health outcomes and situations in which a one-time 
decision making event is important to target. As such, research examining experimental 
variables that impact delay discounting and related processes (e.g., temporal perspective, 
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Example images of the age progression. The top image (A) is an actual photo of the first 
author. The middle image (B) is the nonaged computer-generated image created by using 




nonaged computer-generated images, creating a nonaged image was necessary to create 
the future-self images and so I display that here. The bottom images (C) are three future-
self computer-generated images with three emotions (from left to right): sad, neutral, and 
happy. Participants saw two additional images that approximated a balance between the 







Mean (± SEM) likelihood of quitting for last three blocks of baseline (open squares) and 
first three blocks of mEpFT (open circles) phases. The shaded area between the curves 
indicates area change (a negative effect is represented by a lack of shading between 















Mean (± SEM) likelihood of quitting at each probability value for all participants. Major 
phase change line indicates the change from baseline to mEpFT phase and minor phase 
change line indicates the separation between the first three sessions and last three 








Likelihood of quitting at each probability value across consecutive blocks. Major phase 






Mean (± SEM) likelihood of continuing for last three blocks of baseline (open squares) 
and first three blocks of mEpFT (open circles) phases. The shaded area between the 
curves indicates area change (a negative effect is represented by a lack of shading 















Mean (± SEM) likelihood of continuing at each probability value for all participants. 
Major phase change line indicates the change from baseline to mEpFT phase and minor 
phase change line indicates the separation between the first three sessions and last three 
sessions of the mEpFT phase. Note that unlike Figure 4, the topmost symbols are 
associated with the smallest probability values and the bottommost with the largest 






Likelihood of continuing at each probability value across consecutive blocks. Major 
phase change line indicates transition from baseline to mEpFT phase. Note that unlike 
Figure 4, the topmost symbols are associated with the smallest probability values and the 






Announcement of Opportunity to Participate in Research 
We would like to announce the opportunity to participate in a research project studying 
choice-making during a computerized procedure. During the study, you will make 
different investment related decisions that relate to a hypothetical scenario. As you make 
these choices, you will see computer generated images of yourself which will be created 
using digital photographs of your face taken during the first session. You will need to be 
available to return 5 – 10 times for 45-60 minutes on different days in order to be eligible 
to participate. Your total time commitment will thus be about 5 – 10 hours. 
Participants will be compensated with extra credit for their participation in the study. You 
will earn ½ of 1% point for each session attended. The amount of total extra credit 







TEAR-OFF INFORMED CONSENT STATEMENT 
 




The Department of Applied Behavioral Science at the University of Kansas supports the 
practice of protection for human subjects participating in research. The following 
information is provided for you to decide whether you wish to participate in the present 
study. You may refuse to sign this form and not participate in this study. You should be 
aware that even if you agree to participate, you are free to withdraw at any time. If you 
do withdraw from this study, it will not affect your relationship with this unit, the services 
it may provide to you, or the University of Kansas. 
 
PURPOSE OF THE STUDY 
 
The purpose of the proposed investigation is to evaluate decision-making regarding 
hypothetical outcomes (i.e., differently valued purchases) in college undergraduate 




By participating in this study, you will be asked to make decisions about investing money 
or engaging/quitting in a hobby detrimental to one’s health in a hypothetical scenario. 
Digital photographs will be taken of your face and be used to create computer generated 
images which you might subsequently see while making these decisions. These digital 
photographs will be stored on a secure electronic server and will be deleted once the 
computer generated images are created. For each session lasting approximately 45-60 
minutes, you will come and make these decisions by simply sliding a bar on the screen. 
You will be asked to make approximately 10-30 of these decisions during one session. 
Total time commitment will be approximately 2-10 hours over the course of several 
weeks.  
 
RISKS    
 




Your participation in this study will indirectly benefit society by providing our scientific 
field with information on how college students make choices under varying instructions. 
 





Participants will be compensated by receiving 1/2 of 1% point of extra credit for each 
session attended. This extra credit will be applied to their undergraduate ABSC course 




Your name will not be associated in any publication or presentation with the information 
collected about you or with the research findings from this study. Instead, the researcher 
will use a study number or a pseudonym rather than your name. Your identifiable 
information will not be shared unless required by law or you give written permission. 
 
REFUSAL TO SIGN CONSENT AND AUTHORIZATION 
 
You are not required to sign this Consent and Authorization form and you may refuse to 
do so without affecting your right to any services you are receiving or may receive from 
the University of Kansas or to participate in any programs or events of the University of 
Kansas. However, if you refuse to sign, you cannot participate in this study. 
 
CANCELLING THIS CONSENT AND AUTHORIZATION 
 
You may withdraw your consent to participate in this study at any time.  You also have 
the right to cancel your permission to use and disclose further information collected 
about you, in writing, at any time, by sending your written request to:  Derek D. Reed, 
Ph.D., BCBA-D, 1000 Sunnyside Avenue Room 4048 DHDC, Lawrence, KS 66045 
 
If you cancel permission to use your information, the researchers will stop collecting 
additional information about you. However, the research team may use and disclose 
information that was gathered before they received your cancellation, as described 
above.  
 
QUESTIONS ABOUT PARTICIPATION should be directed to: 
 
Brent A. Kaplan, B.G.S. 
Principal Investigator 
Department of Applied Behavioral Science 
4085 Dole Human Development Center 
University of Kansas 




Derek D. Reed, Ph.D., BCBA-D    
Faculty Supervisor & Co-Investigator    
Department of Applied Behavioral Science 
4048 Dole Human Development Center   
University of Kansas          














I have read this Consent and Authorization form. I have had the opportunity to ask, and I have 
received answers to, any questions I had regarding the study. I understand that if I have any 
additional questions about my rights as a research participant, I may call (785) 864-7429 or 
(785) 864-7385, write the Human Subjects Committee Lawrence Campus (HSCL), University of 
Kansas, 2385 Irving Hill Road, Lawrence, Kansas 66045-7568, or email irb@ku.edu.  
 
I agree to take part in this study as a research participant. By my signature I affirm that I am at 
least 18 years old and that I have received a copy of this Consent and Authorization form.  
 
 




_______________________________         _____________________ 
           Type/Print Participant's Name   Date 
 
 _________________________________________    
























I am a: 
 
(please circle your response below) 
 
Male                                           Female 
 
My major is: 
 
 




My current marital 
status is: 
(please circle your response below) 
 
Single, never married                  Married        Separated 
 
Divorced                  Widowed 
My approximate 
yearly income is: 
(please circle your response below) 
 
Under $10,000                                $10,000 - $19,999 
$20,000 - $29,999                           $30,000 - $39,999 
$40,000 - $49,999                           $50,000 - $74,999 
    $75,000 - $99,999                           $100,000 - $150,000 
Over $150,000                                     Rather not say 
 
Have you ever received a professional diagnosis of 
ADD/ADHD? 
(please circle your response 
below) 
 
YES                NO 
 
 
Have you gambled in any form (examples could include, but 
are not limited to: lotto tickets, bingo, keno, poker, blackjack, 
roulette, slot machines, wagering on horses or sports, dice, etc.) 
two or more times in the past month? 
(please circle your response 
below) 
 
YES                NO 
 
 
Your responses will remain anonymous. All data sheets, including this demographics 







1. What were your overall impressions of the study? 
 
2. What was the hobby that you were thinking of while answering the questions? 
 
3. Was anything hard to understand? 
 
4. Did you notice the pictures? 
 
5. Did the pictures affect how likely you were to quit/continue the hobby? 
 
6. What did you like least about the experiment? 
 
7. Do you think participating in this study will affect your real life decisions? 
 
8. Why did you choose the values that you did? 
 
9. Was the question confusing? 
 
10. Did you notice the facial expressions on the pictures? 
 
11. What were your thoughts on the questions about your future self? 
 
12. On a scale from 1-7 with 1 being extremely dissimilar and 7 being extremely similar, 






First, the researcher uploaded the straight-on photograph to FaceGen Modeller’s 
PhotoFit feature and subsequently tagged several key features of the participant’s face 
(e.g., eyes, ears, mouth, and chin) to maximize accuracy of the model. The two side 
profile pictures were only used if PhotoFit was unable to produce an accurate model. 
Once created, the researcher “aged” the model by sliding two “Age” bars (e.g., shape and 
color) to the maximum level (approximately 65 years old). The new aged picture was 
saved as the “Neutral” image. Using the neutral image as a base, the researcher modified 
it to produce four additional pictures reflecting changes in emotion. Two pictures 
reflected a sad emotion and two pictures reflected a happy emotion. For one of the two 
pictures reflecting the sad emotion, the researcher adjusted the sliding bar corresponding 
with “Expression: Sad” (located under the Morph tab of FaceGen Modeller) half-way of 
the maximum and manually adjusted the outside of the mouth down slightly. This 
produced the “Neutral Sad” picture. For the second sad image, the researcher adjusted the 
aforementioned slider to the maximum and further adjusted the outside of the mouth 
down. This produced the “Sad” picture. To create the first happy image, the researcher 
manipulated the “Smile: Mouth Closed” slider halfway of the maximum and manually 
adjusted the outside of the mouth slightly. This picture was saved as the “Neutral Happy” 
image. To create the second happy image, the researcher manipulated the aforementioned 
slider to the maximum and further adjusted the outside of the mouth. This newly created 
picture was saved as the “Happy” image. FaceGen’s PhotoFit feature does not retain the 
hair during the modeling process; therefore, using Adobe Photoshop the researcher 




computer-generated images. Contrast and saturation settings were modified to change the 
original color of the participant’s hair to gray. 
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